If a launch system meets the definitions of an anti-missile interceptor and a ballistic missile or a glide missile for propulsion, it should be classified as a ballistic missile or planed missile for notification purposes if its intended target is on the surface of the earth, and otherwise as an anti-missile interceptor. None of these predictions are rigorously supported by the cases. In the case of the IWC`s international observer system, the original proposal was specifically aimed at improving the transparency of compliance. However, it took 18 years for IOS to be introduced. This indicates that the parties did not insist on a review. 7 As for the second prediction, there is not much evidence that the IOS, when it finally came into effect, led to greater trust and broader collaboration. The stringency of IWC regulations has increased from the early 1970s to the present, but not because of IOS. In the case of the EPLT, transparency of compliance may have resulted in parties not adhering to the essential protocols, rather than cooperating more fully and at risk of non-compliance. Monitoring and verification were not important aspects of most international environmental issues. Neither at the international nor at the national level have large organizational infrastructures been created to carry out these functions.
Most formal collection of information between schemes is self-reported by existing national organisations, although NGOs and other actors monitor and contribute to some extent to the effectiveness of schemes. Although compliance with the agreements appears to be good, the heavy reliance on national reports, which are incomplete and may be inaccurate due to conflicts of interest, makes it difficult to carry out a true conformity assessment. In addition, the degree of compliance depends crucially on the type and severity of the standard. ORGANIZATION Finally, follow-up activities differ in the organisational arrangements for their implementation. With regard to behavioural control, the series of organisational arrangements depends on the prerogatives of the State, in which self-declaration is the rule. One of the main obstacles in several cases, in particular for the ALPH, has been the absence and/or incompatibility of national emission statistics due to the very different national data collection and reporting capacities required by the international regime. None of the cases where national reports are used has a perfect record; Countries often do not reject falsified reports or submit incomplete or substandard reports (19). This is mainly due to the lack of national organizational capacity to produce such reports. Such misconduct is intentional; In the 1960s, Panama did not submit whaling reports to the IWC, although it could have done so because Panama`s only whaler was involved in a blatant quota violation. The survey and national reports are not the only source of information. The Office for Whaling Statistics and ICES, as mentioned above, are the main data sources for whaling and fishing agreements and are supported not only by Member States but also by industry. In only one case, IWC`s international compliance system was a new organizational capacity explicitly established to assess the accuracy of self-disclosure, and in this case, the program was very small and funded bilaterally by the parties.
Theoretical studies of international cooperation games also indicate that repeated games lead to more successful collaboration over time than static games (92). This is the case when compliance is transparent: the willingness to cooperate more fully and effectively will increase if the parties can have confidence that all other parties have respected previous agreements. This highlights two interrelated predictions: first, parties wishing to improve cooperation over time will seek review procedures to ensure that compliance is transparent. Secondly, in cases where respect is transparent, trust should increase over time, which goes hand in hand with enhanced cooperation. Therefore, it is important to consider not only compliance, but also whether standards are set at the appropriate levels. Since international organizations have neither the power nor the capacity to monitor and enforce standards, we propose for the moment that the most effective standards should be those that allow unilateral action, whether by the parties to the agreement or by other actors such as NGOs. INFORMAL ACTORS The practice of monitoring and verification takes place through many channels, not only through States and organizations formally bound to an international agreement. For example, it is now common for NGOs to claim an important role in the implementation of international agreements by collecting and publishing information on compliance and pressuring states to control pollution.
Pre-test or space launch notifications can help reduce these risks. There are two operational notification agreements involving Russia and the United States: the 1988 US-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Agreement, made legally binding by its inclusion in New START, and the 2002 Hague Multilateral Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, a politically binding document calling for space launch notifications (among many other provisions). In addition, China and Russia concluded their own legally binding notification agreement in 2009, the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, which was extended for ten years in 2020.3 (see Table 1 for a comparison of notification obligations). As Time magazine put it at the time, “Under Reagan`s ceilings, the United States would have to adjust its strategic forces considerably less than the Soviet Union.